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I. INTRODUCTION
A major impetus for the launching of the Federal Securities
Code project in 1969 was the view, widely held by businessmen and
their lawyers, that it was far too easy for investors to bring class
action suits under the federal securities laws, seeking multi-million
dollar judgments against business corporations, directors, accoun-
tants, and lawyers.' The business community's concern about possi-
ble exposure to large judgments in securities litigation was height-
ened by the news that plaintiffs had obtained a judgment in a class
action brought against the issuer and several "outside director"
defendants in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,2 and by sev-
eral United States Supreme Court decisions that appeared to ap-
prove of "implied remedies" for violations of criminal statutes and
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-53 and to elimi-
* Member, Alabama and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., Harvard University, 1952;
J.D., Harvard University, 1955.
1. Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code-Its Purpose, Plan, and Progress,
30 VAND. L. Rav. 315 (1977).
2. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The BarChris action was brought under § 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter referred to as 1933 Act] (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1976)), which expressly creates a civil remedy for investors. The particular significance
of BarChris for potential securities litigation defendants was the exacting scrutiny given by
the court to the "due diligence defense" contentions of the various defendants, including the
outside directors-those directors who did not also hold internal management positions in
BarChris.
3. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
551
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nate any need for each class member to prove "reliance" and "in
fact causation."' Relying on the doctrine expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, some critics suggested that the courts' recognition of a
private right of action for violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 (and other
statutes) was inconsistent with the expressly created civil liability
provisions (and express limitations on the damages recoverable and
the time for filing suit) contained in sections 11, 12, 13, and 15 of
the 1933 Act and sections 16(b), 18, and 20 of the 1934 Act.- Profes-
sor Louis Loss, who has acted as Reporter for the Federal Securities
Code project, expressed the view that civil liability has become a
"jungle," and that SEC Rule 10b-5 has "dwarfed, upstaged, out-
shone, and made wide end runs around, the express civil liability
provisions."'
Two of the most important provisions of the proposed Code,
therefore, are section 1708,7 which imposes a ceiling on recoveries
4. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (in a nondis-
closure case, if plaintiff shows that the nondisclosed fact was "material," he need not sepa-
rately prove reliance or causation); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (in a
misrepresentation suit arising from a proxy rule violation, reliance ordinarily should be pre-
sumed once the misrepresentation is shown to be "material").
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act] (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77m, 77o, 78p(b), 78r, 78t (1976)). For example, section 11(e) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e), limits the liability of an underwriter who participates in a public
offering to the offering price of the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the
public. Section 11(g) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k (g), limits the damages recoverable
under § 11 to the price at which the security was sold to the public. Section 13 of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, provides that any action seeking recovery under § 11 or § 12 must be
filed within one year from the date of discovery and within three years after the security was
bona fide offered to the public. Section 18(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c), contains a
similar built-in statute of limitations. There is no federal statute prescribing a specific statute
of limitations applicable to implied actions for damages based on SEC Rule 10b-5 or under
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Instead, the federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of
limitations, which frequently is longer than the time limits imposed by § 13 of the 1933 Act
and § 18 of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1976); Clegg v. Clark, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1973). The courts uniformly have held that the statute of limitations in an
action under Rule 10b-5 does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the fraud practiced
on him (or until he should have discovered the fraud). See, e.g., Azalea Meats v. Muscat,
386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967). In some actions brought under § 11 or § 12(1) of the 1933 Act, the
time for filing suit prescribed by § 13 has been held to be an absolute bar, "irrespective of
whether the plaintiff knew of the fraud," Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978),
but fraudulent concealment has been held to toll the running of the § 13 limitations period.
Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1977).
6. Loss, supra note 1, at 315.
7. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 708 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Draft] provides:
[Measure of damages for sections 1703-07.]
(a) [For section 1703(a).] The measure of damages under section 1703(a) is
(1) if the plaintiff is a buyer, the amount that he paid (with interest) less
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the value of the security as of the end of the reasonable period specified in
section 1703(h)(1), and less any return (with interest) that he received on the
security, except that
(A) to the extent that the plaintiff sold a security of the class and
series after his purchase and before the end of the reasonable period
specified in section 1703(h)(1), the measure of damages is the amount
that he paid (with interest) less any return (with interest) that he re-
ceived on the security, and less the amount that he received on sale (with
interest), and
(B) to the extent that the defendant bought a security of the class
and series after his sale on which the action is based and before the end
of the reasonable period specified in section 1703(h)(1) at a profit (com-
pared with his sale price to the plaintiff) greater than the measure of
damages as defined in the foregoing portion of section 1708(a)(1), the
measure of damages is that profit; and
(2) if the plaintiff is a seller, the value of the security as of the end of the
reasonable period specified in section 1703(h)(1) plus any return (with interest)
that the buyer received on the security, less the amount (with interest) that the
plaintiff received, except that
(A) to the extent that the plaintiff bought a security of the class and
series after his sale and before the end of the reasonable period specified
in section 1703(h)(1), the measure of damages is the amount that he paid
on purchase (with interest) plus any return (with interest) that the buyer
received on the security, less the amount (with interest) that the plaintiff
received, and
(B) to the extent that the defendant sold a security of the class and
series after his purchase on which the action is based and before the end
of the reasonable period specified in section 1703(h)(1) at a profit (com-
pared with his purchase price from the plaintiff) greater than the measure
of damages as defined in the foregoing portion of section 1708(a)(2), the
measure of damages is that profit.
(b) [For section 1703(b).] The measure of damages under section 1703(b) is com-
puted as in section 1708(a), except that
(1) sections 1703(h)(1)(B), 1708(a)(1)(A), and 1708(a)(2)(A) do not apply;
(2) the measure is reduced to the extent (which may be complete) that
the defendant proves that the violation did not cause the loss; and
(3) the measure (apart from any assessment of consequential damages or
costs under section 1723(a) and (d)) is limited as if all the plaintiffs, together
with all the members of the class in the case of a class action, had bought (or
sold) only the amount of securities that the defendant had sold (or bought). See
also section 1711.
(c) [For section 1704.] The measure of damages under section 1704 is computed as
in section 1708(a), except as provided in section 1708(b)(1) and (2), and except that
(1) in an action involving an offering statement or amendment
(A) the measure (apart from any assessment of consequential dam-
ages or costs under section 1723(a) and (d)) is limited as if all the plain-
tiffs, together with all the members of the class in the case of a class
action, had bought (or sold) only the amount of securities that the de-
fendant has sold (or bought),
(B) the price may not be taken to exceed the public offering price,
and
(C) in no event is an underwriter liable for more than the portion
of the total public offering price represented by the portion of the distri-
bution underwritten by him; and
(2) the measure (inclusive of any consequential damages or costs assessed
under section 1723(a) and (d)) is limited with respect to a particular filing (or
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unless knowledge' is proven, and section 1711,9 which creates new
procedures for consolidation of securities litigation, notice to poten-
with respect to substantially the same misrepresentation or omission reflected
in more than one filing or form of publicity within section 1704 or 1707 or both)
to the greatest, so far as each defendant is concerned, of
(A) $100,000,
(B) one percent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of gross revenues in
the defendant's last fiscal year before the filing of the action, or
(C) the profit specified in section 1708(a)(1)(B) or 1708(a)(2)(B);
but section 1708(c)(2) does not apply if the plaintiff proves a misrepresentation
made with knowledge by the particular defendant, nor does it apply with respect
to the registrant to the extent that an offering statement or amendment covers
a distribution by or for its account or benefit, or with respect to an underwriter.
See also section 1711.
(d) [For sections 1705 and 1707.] The measure of damages under sections 1705
and 1707 is computed as in section 1708(c), read without the references to offering
statements or amendments and as if section 1708(c)(2) referred to section 1705 rather
than section 1704.
8. The term scienter has generally been considered roughly synonomous with
"knowledge," but has been given various meanings. The United States Supreme Court has
held that some element of scienter must be proved in order to recover damages under SEC
Rule lOb-5, but has expressly reserved decision on whether reckless disregard would be suffi-
cient. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Several post-Hochfelder
decisions permit recovery of damages under Rule 10b-5 upon proof of reckless conduct. See,
e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977).
9. 1978 Draft, supra note 7, § 1711 provides:
[Proration of damages.] (a) [Scope of section.] Section 1711 applies to actions
under section 1702(b), 1703(b), 1704, 1705, 1706, or 1707, or within section 1710(d). See
also section 1819(1).
(b) [Initial procedure.] Promptly after the second or any subsequent such action
(in the same court or elsewhere) is instituted against the same defendant, he shall, by
written notice to every court involved, (1) identify all such actions, and (2) state whether
their aggregate prayers for damages against him exceed the limitation on damages with
respect to any such action.
(c) [Reference to multidistrict panel.] Whether or not the defendant gives such
notice, every court in w.hich such an action is pending, promptly after learning that such
an action is pending against the same defendant in another court and that the aggregate
prayers for damages exceed the limitation with respect to any such action, shall (1)
transmit the record or records before it to the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by section 1407 of the Judicial Code, and (2) stay the action or actions before
it pending determination by the panel.
(d) [Procedure before panel.] The panel, after notice and hearing pursuant to
section 1407(c) of the Judicial Code, and on consideration of (1) the convenience of
parties and witnesses, (2) whatever disposition will promote the just and efficient con-
duct of the litigation, and (3) the extent to which one or more actions have progressed,
shall consolidate all the actions and transfer the consolidated action for all purposes to
any district court (herein "the trial court"), whether or not an action was previously
pending or venue lies under section 1822(f) in that court. Section 1407(b) of the Judicial
Code applies to the consolidated action for purpose of trial as well as pretrial proceed-
ings. The panel may separate and remand any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-
party claim. The papers in any action that is subsequently filed in any court other than
the trial court and that would have been subject to section 1711 if it had been filed before
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tial plaintiffs, and proration and distribution of any recovery to
those investors who are damaged by the defendant's wrongful act.
The proposed ceiling on recoveries and the proposed procedures for
distributing such recoveries raise a number of practical problems.
This Article will explore those problems, attempt to determine
whether sections 1708 and 1711 are workable, and propose possible
alternatives.
the panel's transfer order shall be transmitted to the panel for disposition consistent with
the section.
(e) [Review of panel orders.] Orders of the panel are reviewable only pursuant to
section 1407(e) of the Judicial Code.
(f) [Actions not referrable to panel.] When a notice identifies one or more pending
actions pursuant to section 1711(b)(1) and they are all in the same court, that court shall
consolidate the actions and function as the trial court for purposes of section 1711 until
it learns of the pendency of such an action against the same defendant in another court.
(g) [Dismissal or compromise.] A consolidated action under section 1711 may not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the trial court.
(h) [Notice to potential plaintiffs.] Before entering judgment if the statute of
limitations has not expired with respect to all actions within section 1711(b)(1), or before
approving a dismissal or compromise, the trial court shall order that all potential plain-
tiffs be given the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including considera-
tion of the cost (which the court may charge, in whole or in part, to any party). No such
action may be brought (1) after expiration of the statute of limitations or (2) more than
ninety days after such notice, whichever date occurs first.
(i) [Class actions.] When the consolidated action in the trial court is determined
to be a class action, the relevant procedure with respect to class actions applies to the
extent that it is not inconsistent with section 1711.
(j) [Recipients of damages.] If the aggregate damages awarded in an action under
any of the sections specified in section 1711(a) exceed the limitation in any of those
sections, the trial court shall award the proceeds (after payment of any costs assessed
under section 1723(d))
(1) among all the plaintiffs (or all members of the class or any appropriate
subclass if it is a class action) to the extent that the trial court determines that
the expense of making the proration is warranted in relation to the amounts that
would be awarded to individual plaintiffs (or members of the class or subclass),
(2) otherwise to the issuer if (A) the action is not brought under sections
1704 to 1707 inclusive, (B) the issuer is not held liable as a defendant, and (C)
the trial court determines that under the circumstances, including the degree
of ownership of the issuer by the defendants, an award to the issuer would not
be inequitable, and
(3) otherwise to SIPC.
(k) [Appointment of master.] When the circumstances warrant, the trial court
may appoint a master, who may be the bankruptcy judge for the district, to aid in
making any proration under section 1711(j). A bankruptcy judge so appointed shall be
compensated and reimbursed for his expenses on the same basis as another master.
(i) [Rulemaking authority.] The panel may adopt, amend, suspend, and rescind
rules to carry out section 1711.
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11. THE PROPOSED LIMITs ON LIABILITY FOR INADVERTENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS
Section 1708(c)(2) undertakes to establish a limit on each de-
fendant's liability if a registrant files a deceptive report with the
SEC or issues a deceptive news release, or if the registrant files
several reports with the SEC or issues several news releases that
contain the same misrepresentation. Each defendant's liability is
limited to the greatest of: (a) $100,000; (b) one percent (to a maxi-
mum of $1,000,000) of gross revenues in the defendant's last fiscal
year before the filing of the action, if the defendant is a
"company;" 0 or (c) the profit realized by a defendant on his sale of
securities. The ceiling on liability does not apply, however, "if the
plaintiff proves a misrepresentation made with knowledge by the
particular defendant . . . . "I' Moreover, there is no ceiling on lia-
bility with respect to a registrant, to the extent that an offering
statement or amendment covers a distribution by or for its account
or benefit, or with respect to an underwriter.
Because section 1708(c) (2) does not limit the amount that can
be recovered if a plaintiff can prove a misrepresentation "made with
knowledge by the particular defendant," section 1708 creates an
incentive for the plaintiff to include in his complaint an allegation
that each misrepresentation complained of was "made with knowl-
edge" by each of the defendants, in addition or as an alternative to
the simpler allegation that such a misrepresentation was made (or
was negligently made).
It is one thing to allege scienter.12 It is another thing to prove
it. Moreover, section 1708 does not clearly state what must be
proved, nor how it may be proved. One may argue that section 1708
requires the plaintiff who wishes to avoid the ceiling on liability to
prove not only (a) that the misrepresentation complained of was
known by the particular defendant to be false, but also (b) that such
misrepresentation was "made" by that defendant. It is questiona-
ble, however, whether that meaning really is intended. If it is proved
that an individual officer or director named as a defendant sat qui-
etly while the company issued a false press release or filed a false
report that the individual defendant knew at the time was false, the
individual defendant should not be permitted to claim that his own
10. 1978 Draft, supra note 7, § 228 provides: " 'Company' means a corporation, partner-
ship, association, joint-stock company, trust (other than a conventional inter vivos or testa-
mentary trust), separate account, or fund, an organized group of persons, or a receiver, trustee
in bankruptcy, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any of the foregoing."
11. See note 7 supra.
12. See note 8 supra.
556 [Vol. 32:551
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liability is limited by section 1708, even though it might be argued
that the false filing or release was "made" by the corporate regis-
trant."
How does a party go about proving that a corporate registrant
named as a defendant did or did not have knowledge of a misrepre-
sentation at the time of a news release or SEC filing? It may be
argued that a corporation only acts by or through its officers, em-
ployees, and agents, and should be held to "know" only such facts
as are known by its officers, employees, and agents. Under familiar
respondeat superior principles, a company probably would be held
liable without limit if the plaintiff proves that the officer or em-
ployee who issued the release knew at the time that the release was
false. The corporate registrant might call its president, financial
vice president, and auditor to testify that they did not know that a
particular statement made in the news release or SEC filing was
false. It seems doubtful, however, that a corporate registrant would
be permitted to argue that its officers and it did not know that a
particular statement made in its own filings with the SEC was false,
if the falsity of the statement could have been determined from an
examination of the corporation's own books and records. Thus it
would seem that a party should be permitted to prove or disprove
knowledge on the part of a company, its officers, and its directors,
by offering (a) the books and records of the company, and (b) testi-
mony of employees or officers of the company."
Section 1708 does not clearly indicate the extent to which famil-
iar principles of respondeat superior and attribution of knowledge
13. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966)
(upholding against motion to dismiss a complaint which alleged that the defendant was liable
because it failed to report known violations by another). In Brennan, the court stated:
"[There are circumstances under which a person or a corporation may give the requisite
assistance or encouragement to a wrongdoer so as to constitute an aiding and abetting by
merely failing to take action." Id. at 682. After trial, defendant was found liable. 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1969).
14. See Hall v. Henderson, 126 Ala. 449, 493, 28 So. 531, 543 (1900) (quoting THoMPSON
ON CORPORATIONS § 5308). Hall holds that directors and officers of a corporation may be held
to be
conclusively presumed to know its condition, its business, its receipts and expenditures,
and all the general facts which go to make up that condition and business, as shown by
the entries on its regular books. The reason of this is that it is their duty to know these
things in the exercise of their official functions.
The presumption appears to be recognized, but it is considered rebuttable in some states.
See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N.Y. 365, 23 N.E. 544 (1890). In others, it has been
suggested that the degree of knowledge of the company's affairs that might reasonably be
expected of directors depends on the size of the corporation and other factors. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120 (1901).
1979]1 557
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apply. Could a corporate registrant limit its own liability by proving
that the officer or employee who issued a false news release or SEC
filing was engaged in a fraud on his corporation, on the theory that
a principal is not chargeable with the knowledge of an agent who is
engaged in a fraud upon his principal? 5 Could a partnership limit
its liability under section 1708, even though the partner (or an em-
ployee of the partnership working on a matter assigned to him in
the usual course of business) is shown to have known a press release
or SEC filing was false, by proving that the managing partner and
other partners had no actual knowledge of the falsity of the report
or filing?" Could the individual partners of an accounting firm or
law firm, if named as defendants solely because of the acts of an-
other partner (or employee acting in the line and scope), claim the
benefit of the limits established by section 1708?" These questions
do not appear to be clearly answered by section 1708.
Section 1708 creates an incentive for plaintiff's counsel to allege
more than one misrepresentation or omission, each of which may be
the basis for a separate count of the complaint. The purpose of
15. See, e.g., State Bank of Pamplin v. Payne, 156 Va. 837, 843, 159 S.E. 163, 165
(1931):
It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the broad general doctrine that the
principal is bound by the knowledge of an agent; that so far as third persons are con-
cerned, notice to an agent is notice to his principal, even though the agent has not in
fact communicated such notice. The basis for that rule is the duty of the agent to disclose
all material facts coming to his knowledge with reference to the subject of his agency,
and the presumption that he has discharged that duty. There is an important exception,
however, to this rule, in cases where the knowledge of the agent is obtained while he is
himself engaged in committing an independent fraudulent act on his own part, commu-
nication of which to the principal would prevent its consummation. To this exception
there is a qualification, equally important and decisive; that is, in cases in which the
agent, when committing the fraud, was the sole representative of the principal. When
this appears, the general rule of imputed notice to his principal applies.
16. Sections 12 and 13 of the Uniform Partnership Act provide as follows:
§ 12. Partnership Charged with Knowledge of or Notice to partner.-Notice
to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the
partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his
mind, and the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and should have
communicated it to the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the partner-
ship, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent
of that partner.
§ 13. Partnership Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act.-Where, by any wrongful
act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partner-
ship is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
17. See note 16 supra. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals disqualified a law firm, reaffirming the
traditional rule that knowledge imparted by a client to one partner of a large law firm is to
be imputed to all members of the firm.
558
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alleging more than one misrepresentation would be to obtain sepa-
rate judgments with respect to each misrepresentation, so as to
argue that each defendant's maximum liability is some multiple of
the limit established by section 1708(c)(2).
In addition to creating an incentive to complain of as many
separate and distinct misrepresentations as possible, section 1708
may further complicate securities litigation by creating an incentive
to sue as many defendants as possible." Under existing law, plain-
tiff's attorneys often sue only the company (in those cases in which
the company is financially able to respond in damages) in order to
simplify the litigation. If the Code is adopted, plaintiff's attorneys
will have an incentive to sue all the directors, as well as the com-
pany, in order to maximize the total recovery. Since publicly held
corporations often purchase directors' and officers' insurance and
agree to indemnify their directors," the litigation costs resulting
from any increased pressures to name the directors as defendants
will ultimately be borne in large part by public corporations. On the
other hand, the $100,000 limit on the liability of individual defen-
dants (in the absence of proof of scienter) should make it easier for
public corporations to obtain adequate insurance coverage for direc-
tors and officers with respect to inadvertent misrepresentations.20
Thus section 1708 may have some undesirable effects on securi-
ties litigation because it creates an incentive to sue more defendants
18. This approach would be not unlike the familiar "shotgun" approach now followed
by a few plaintiffs attorneys in personal injury litigation and in securities litigation. They
follow the familiar advice to "sue everyone in sight" under every conceivable theory, hoping
to find at least one claim against at least one defendant that ultimately can be proved and
collected or settled. Whereas the primary purpose of the shotgun approach is to find a
substantive claim that will produce liability, the purpose of alleging more than one misrepre-
sentation or suing more than one defendant under the Code would be to avoid the ceiling on
the amount of damages recoverable notwithstanding § 1708(c)(2). The shotgun approach
obviously complicates litigation. Most plaintiff's attorneys prefer the "rifle" approach. In
cases in which a registrant is solvent, advocates of the rifle approach might well decide not
to sue the registrant's directors. Suing the directors adds to the complexity of the plaintiffs
case, and may actually result in a lower verdict (because of jury sympathy for individual
defendants). Under the proposed Code, however, there would be some incentive to sue all the
directors, in order to recover $100,000 per director, in addition to the maximum recovery
permissible from the registrant.
19. The validity of such indemnification agreements has been opposed by the SEC. 17
C.F.R. § 230.460 (1978). In Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), the court refused to enforce an indemnity agreement on
policy grounds underlying the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The continuing validity of indemnification
and the Code's impact on that controversy still is open to question. See generally Kroll, Some
Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of
BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681, 685-92 (1969).
20. The SEC has not opposed insurance against liabilities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), reprinted in [1968] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1S 3760-3813.
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and to allege several separate and distinct misrepresentations. The
impact on securities litigation, however, should not be unduly seri-
ous, because there are offsetting pressures on plaintiffs counsel to
keep his case as simple as possible. The jury may throw up its hands
if the case is too complicated. Moreover, if a large number of defen-
dants are sued and a number of misrepresentations are relied upon,
the trial court may refuse to certify the action as a class action on
the ground that it is unmanageable as such. Accordingly, although
section 1708 may result in some increase in the complexity of securi-
ties litigation (thereby increasing litigation costs and the burdens
upon the courts and parties), there are offsetting practical restraints
that should prove reasonably effective.
IW. THE PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF LITIGATION,
NOTICE To ALL POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS, AND PRORATION OF DAMAGES
When more than one action is instituted against the same de-
fendant, consolidation of all actions appears to be mandatory under
the Code. Section 1711(b) provides that the defendant "shall, by
written notice to every court involved, (1) identify all such actions,
and (2) state whether their aggregate prayers for damages against
him exceed the limitation on damages with respect to any such
action."21 The consequences, if the defendant fails to notify each
court in which such an action is filed, are not spelled out by the
statute. It could be argued that any defendant who fails to comply
with the statute waives whatever right he might have to contend
that his liability to all similar plaintiffs is limited by section 1708.
The Code provides, however, that whether or not the defendant
gives such notice, every court in which any such action is pending
that learns that other actions are pending against the same defen-
dant and that the aggregate damages sought exceed the recovery
limits provided for by the Code shall "(1) transmit the record or
records before it to the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by section 1407 of the Judicial Code, and (2) stay the
action or actions before it pending determination by the panel."22
Section 1711(d) provides that the Judicial Panel "shall" consolidate
21. See note 9 supra.
22. Id. Contrast Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation, which presently provides:
The pendency of a motion or order to show cause before the Panel concerning
transfer of an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not affect or suspend orders and
pretrial proceedings in the district court in which the action is pending and does not in
any way limit the pretrial jurisdiction of that court. A transfer shall be effective when
the transfer order is filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the transferee
district.
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and transfer all such actions to any appropriate district court for
pretrial proceedings and for trial." Section 1711(g) provides that the
actions which have been consolidated for trial under section 1711
"may not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
trial court." 24
Section 1711(h) provides that the trial court "shall order that
all potential plaintiffs be given the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including consideration of the cost (which the court
may charge, in whole or in part, to any party)" before entering
judgment if the statute of limitations has not expired with respect
to all actions within section 1711, or before approving a dismissal
or compromise. 25 Section 1711(h) also provides that "[n]o such
action may be brought (1) after expiration of the statute of limita-
tions or (2) more than ninety days after such notice, whichever date
occurs first."2
Thus, even though none of the consolidated actions was filed
as a class action and even though the trial court may have deter-
mined that the consolidated action is not manageable or maintaina-
ble as a class action, section 1711(h) seems to require (a) that the
trial or settlement of a securities case be delayed until the statute
of limitations has run, which seems highly undesirable; or (b) that
the "best possible notice practicable under the circumstances" be
given to "all potential plaintiffs" of the pendency of any securities
action if the complaint can be construed as including, as one of the
claims asserted, a claim based on a negligent or inadvertent viola-
tion of the Federal Securities Code by any one of the defendants.
The language of section 1711 suggests that published notice (in, say,
the Federal Register) would be sufficient if individual notice to each
potential plaintiff would be inordinately expensive. Section 1711(e),
however, provides that the court-ordered notice is intended to
shorten the statute of limitations for the filing of similar actions by
all potential plaintiffs to a date ninety days following such notice,
so that each potential plaintiff's claims will be barred unless (a) the
court has ordered that the consolidated action be maintained as a
class action, or (b) the potential plaintiff files his own individual
action for damages within ninety days from date of such notice.
Apparently the ninety days would begin to run upon the date of
mailing notice or publication of notice, rather than upon the date
of receipt. Accordingly, if a potential plaintiff has moved and re-
23. See note 9 supra.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
1979] 561
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ceives no actual notice, or is on vacation, or for some other reason
does not promptly receive actual notice, section 1711(h) would
nonetheless bar his claim unless he files suit within ninety days, or
unless the court has directed that the consolidated action be main-
tained as a class action.
Section 1711 creates serious practical disincentives for the
plaintiff who seeks only individual relief. The requirement that the
best practicable notice be given to all potential plaintiffs even if no
action was filed as a class action and even if the trial court has not
ordered the consolidated action to be maintained as a class action,
and providing that all or part of the costs of such notice may be
taxed against the plaintiff, will probably have a "chilling effect" on
the filing of individual actions seeking recovery only for individual
plaintiffs.
On the other hand, section 1711 should be of material assis-
tance to the plaintiff who files a class action. The trial courts will
probably be more likely to permit an action subject to section 1711
to be maintained as a class action. The trial court may be reluctant
to issue the notice required by section 1711 if there is no class action
because the expense of such notice may exceed the amount in con-
troversy and because valid claims of potential plaintiffs will be
barred if they fail to file suit within ninety days. Moreover, certifica-
tion of the consolidated action as a class action should not materi-
ally add to management problems already imposed on the trial
court by section 1711. Finally, section -1711 vests the trial court with
discretion to tax part of the costs of the notice against the defen-
dants.
Section 1711 appears to raise due process questions if no one has
sought in the first instance to represent a class and if no action has
been certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Y Let us suppose that a trial court
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or
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(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced byor against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, includ-
ing individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class
if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2)
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be con-
strued and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceed-
ings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presenta-
tion of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representa-
tive parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from
time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
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directs that notice to all potential plaintiffs, pursuant to section
1711(h), be given by publication shortly after the date of the alleged
misrepresentation. Would such published notice in, let us say, the
Federal Register be sufficient under due process standards to start
the ninety days running against all potential plaintiffs? In cases in
which the consolidated action was commenced as a class action and
has been certified as a class action, so that failure of a potential
plaintiff to file suit will not bar his right to share in any recovery
effected for the class, it may be argued that the interests of all
similarly situated persons have been and will be properly protected
and represented by the representative plaintiff, under the doctrine
of "virtual representation," so as to make the court's order and
notice binding under traditional due process grounds." But if the
action has not been certified as a class action, so that the failure of
a potential plaintiff to act will bar his claim, it might be argued that
due process requires, at the very least, that each potential plaintiff
whose address is readily ascertainable must be given individual
notice (as distinguished from notice by publication), before his
claim could be held to be barred.29 Moreover, it may be argued
under some circumstances that ninety days notice is inadequate to
permit potential plaintiffs to investigate the matter and make an
intelligent decision, and that barring the claim on only ninety days
notice deprives the potential plaintiff of due process. 0
Section 1711(i) provides, when a consolidated action is deter-
mined to be a class action, that the trial court shall follow the
procedures established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure3 1 for handling class actions, but only to the extent that
such procedures are not inconsistent with section 1711. Three such
inconsistencies should be noted. First, section 1711 does not ex-
pressly require that individual notice be given to all potential plain-
tiffs; in those cases in which the costs of individual notice would be
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compro-
mise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
28. Under the doctrine of virtual representation, a judgment in a properly certified class
action binds those members of the class whose interests were adequately represented by
existing parties to the litigation. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683 (1961); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
29. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane
the Court declared that due process requires that the means of notice to interested parties
"must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it." Id. at 315. Although the means may vary from case to case, "[e]xceptions
in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability
notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties." Id. at 318.
30. See note 29 supra.
31. See note 27 supra.
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prohibitive, notice by publication is apparently thought to be suffi-
cient." In other class actions for damages brought under Rule
23(b)(3), Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual notice to all class mem-
bers "who can be identified through reasonable effort." 3 Second,
civil actions filed under the Federal Securities Code for damages in
those in which any of the section 1708 limitations on liability may
apply, section 1711(h) authorizes the trial court to tax the costs of
notice in whole or in part against the defendants.34 Rule 23, on the
other hand, has been construed as requiring that the costs of notice
to the class must be borne by plaintiffs.35 Third, under section 1711
of the proposed Federal Securities Code, potential plaintiffs or class
members cannot effectively request exclusion from the consolidated
action." In contrast, Rule 23(c)(2) provides that in class actions for
damages maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), each member of the class
must be notified that he may request exclusion from the class.3 1
Under present Rule 23 procedures a claimant with a substantial
claim may opt out of a class action for the purpose of filing a sepa-
rate action seeking money damages. The separate action may, of
course, be consolidated with the class action or other individual
actions for trial pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,3 or consolidated for pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a).3
32. It might be argued, however, that it is a violation of the due process required by
the Constitution to bar or adjudicate the claims of potential plaintiffs without representation
of their interests and without notice reasonably designed to call the matter to their attention,
including individual notice to those potential plaintiffs whose address is known or ascertaina-
ble with reasonable effort. See notes 28-29 supra.
33. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen was an antitrust and
securities action brought on behalf of approximately 3,750,000 odd-lot investors against the
major odd-lot dealers on the New York Stock Exchange. The Supreme Court construed Rule
23(c)(2) as requiring that individual notice be given to all class members whose names and
addresses could be ascertained through reasonable effort, at the expense of the plaintiff.
34. See note 9 supra.
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See note 9 supra.
37. See note 27 supra.
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a) provides:
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters
in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers
for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote
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The inability to opt out of the consolidated action and the
mandatory transfer requirements of section 1711(d) will create spe-
cial problems in cases in which plaintiffs allege in one or more
counts or separate complaints that a particular defendent acted
"with knowledge" and other plaintiffs (or counts) do not allege
scienter on the part of that defendant." In a Reporter's Comment,
Professor Loss states that the third sentence of section 1711(d)
"takes care" of those situations in which inconsistent allegations are
made, presumably by allowing separation of claims or suits in such
cases." The third sentence of section 1711(d) merely states, how-
ever, that "[tihe panel may separate and remand any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim."
The suggestion that individual claims might be separated out
and remanded seems impractical. It would be undesirable to burden
the defendants and the federal courts with separate discovery pro-
ceedings before several federal courts at the same time with respect
to the same set of facts, merely because one plaintiff alleges that a
particular defendant acted with knowledge and another plaintiff (or
the same plaintiff in another count of his complaint) does not allege
such knowledge. Moreover, except in unusual circumstances it
would be inefficient and wasteful to try the same plaintiff's case
twice with respect to the same conduct, the same defendants, the
same transactions, and the same news release or SEC filings, merely
because a plaintiff in one count of his complaint charges a particular
defendant with knowledge and in another does not. Rules 18,1 19,"
the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be re-
manded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the
district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated:
Provided, however, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action
is remanded.
40. Since what was known by each defendant is not ordinarily ascertainable by the
plaintiff and his lawyer on the date of filing the action, and since the amount which can be
recovered from any defendant is unlimited in the event the plaintiff can prove the particular
defendant acted with knowledge, it follows that most plaintiffs' complaints will include
allegations that each defendant had knowledge of the misrepresentation. This will not always,
however, be the case.
41. The comment to § 1711(d) of the 1978 Draft states in full: "The reference to venue
at the end of the 1st sentence has been added. And a comment will state that the 3d sentence
takes care (inter alia) of the complaint that pleads a misrepresentation in the alternative with
and without knowledge."
42. See note 9 supra.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 18 provides:
(a) Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as
alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an
opposing party.
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20," 23,6 and 42(a)4 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28
(b) Joinder of Remedies; Fraudulent Conveyances. Whenever a claim is one
heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the
two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action
only in accorance with the relative substantive rights of the parties. In particular, a
plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a conveyance
fraudulent as to him, without first having obtained a judgment establishing the claim
for money.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should
join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case,
an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render
the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as de-
scribed in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall deter-
mine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include; first, to what extent a judgment
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plain-
tiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
45. FED. R. Cv. P. 20 provides:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All
persons (and any vessel, cargo or other property subject to admiralty process in rem)
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all defendents will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judg-
ment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights
to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from
being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom
he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials
or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
46. See note 27 supra.
47. See note 38 supra.
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U.S.C. H§ 1404(a)a and 1407(a)49 are designed to permit the parties
to avoid duplicative discovery, multiple trials, and multiple hear-
ings arising out of the same facts. It seems highly unlikely as a
practical matter, therefore, that the Judicial Panel would ever de-
cide to separate out and remand to another court any actions or
claims based upon the same facts, SEC filings, news releases, and
transactions, merely because one plaintiff or a plaintiff in one count
alleges that a particular defendant acted with knowledge and an-
other makes no such allegation. Thus, it is difficult to see how the
third sentence of section 1711(d) "takes care" of any problem and
it seems doubtful that this provision would ever be used.
If a plaintiff who does not wish to be transferred under section
1711(d) to another district for all purposes, including trial, alleges
that each defendant acted with knowledge, then the entire proce-
dure established by section 1711 arguably is inapplicable to that
particular plaintiffs complaint, so that the Judicial Panel would
have no authority under section 1711 to transfer that plaintiff's
action to another district for pretrial purposes and for trial. Under
existing case law interpreting the liberal pleading procedures estab-
lished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, that plain-
tiff might be entitled to recover, notwithstanding the allegations of
his complaint, under the "lesser included offense," on proof of a
misrepresentation made without knowledge. 0 Thus, if the plaintiff
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
49. See note 39 supra.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides in part: "every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings."
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) provides: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice."
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) provides:
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presenta-
tion of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintain-
ing his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 48 (1957):
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
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alleges that a misrepresentation was made with knowledge, but fails
to prove knowledge to the satisfaction of the jury, the plaintiff might
nonetheless be entitled to recover a judgment, and the court might
be bound to instruct the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery
for the misrepresentation' (subject, of course, to the limitations on
recovery imposed by section 1708).
A practical solution to these problems would be an order of the
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 2 or an order of the Judicial
Panel under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 5 transferring the action complaining
of misrepresentations made "with knowledge" to the same district
court selected by the panel for other cases under section 1711 of the
Federal Securities Code. In the event of a transfer under section
1407, the transferee court would then have the power to transfer the
case for all purposes to the transferee district for trial pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The Code does not change the existing law preserving existing
remedies under state law." Accordingly, pendent state law claims
arising out of the same facts can be asserted in the federal court
action. 5 The recovery on pendent claims would not be subject to the
limitations imposed by section 1708 on the damages recoverable
under the Code." There is the troublesome possibility that defen-
dants may be subjected to the burden of defending in state and
federal courts separate actions regarding the same transaction. This
problem might be handled by moving for a stay of proceedings in
the state court until the trial or settlement of the federal and state
claims in the federal court action. A trial of the federal court action
could be dispositive of the factual issues raised in the state court
under res judicata or collateral estoppel principles.57
As a practical matter, the procedures established by section
1711 requiring transfer and consolidation of all actions brought
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.
The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.
51. Id.
52. See note 48 supra.
53. See note 39 supra.
54. 1978 Draft, supra note 7, § 1904(i)(1) provides: "(i) [Residual state power.] (1)
Nothing in this Code affects the application of State law to any security, transaction, or
person except as provided in sections 917(a) and (b), 1904(a) to (d) inclusive, and 1906."
55. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 882 (1973); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337 (10th Cir. 1972).
56. Id.
57. Parklane Hoshiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 960 (1979).
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under the Code in one district and requiring that notice be given to
all potential plaintiffs, appear to be unnecessarily awkward, expen-
sive, and cumbersome, and may unduly inhibit the filing of individ-
ual actions seeking individual relief. In cases in which no action has
been filed as a class action or ordered to be maintained as a class
action, or in which the defendants are reasonably confident that
they will be able to defeat any plaintiffs' actions or settle them for
a modest or nominal sum, the defendants might, prefer to be given
an option not to take advantage of section 1708's limitations on
liability, particularly if the price that must be paid for such limita-
tions on liability is the notice required by section 1711 to all poten-
tial claimants and if all or part of the costs of such notice may be
imposed by the court on the defendants. The costs of the notice
alone (entirely aside from the unfavorable publicity) may exceed
the amount sued for an individual action. If no plaintiff has filed a
class action, or if the defendants feel that the trial court will not
permit the plaintiff's actions to be maintained as a class action, or
if the defendants feel confident that they can defeat the plaintiff's
action, it seems questionable why notice must nonetheless be given
to all potential plaintiffs of a claim which the defendants (and the
court) may justifiably feel is totally lacking in merit.
From the viewpoint of the defendant, therefore, section 1711 of
the Code may create more problems than section 1708 solves, at
least in those cases in which no one has filed a class action. The
defendants may be confident of victory or confident that they can
settle the case cheaply, and prefer to defend (or settle) the action
without giving notice to all potential plaintiffs.
From the viewpoint of the individual plaintiff, the transfer,
notice, and proration procedures created by section 1711 seem
highly undesirable. Section 1711 appears to permit a trial court to
require an individual plaintiff who has filed an individual action to
pay part or all of the costs of giving the best practicable notice to
all potential plaintiffs. The cost of such notice may exceed the
amount claimed. Accordingly, section 1711 may have an unduly
chilling effect upon the filing of individual actions. An individual
plaintiff who wishes to litigate an individual claim should be per-
mitted to do so without being encumbered with the costs of notice
and other burdens presently attendant to bringing, maintaining,
and litigating a class action.
IV. CONcLUSION
Section 1708 appears to create reasonable limits on liability for
inadvertent misrepresentations. Although it may tend to complicate
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securities litigation, there are countervailing pressures on plaintiffs
counsel to simplify such litigation, and the adverse effects of section
1708 should not be great.
Section 1711, however, appears to create unduly burdensome
and cumbersome procedures. Section 1711 may deter an individual
plaintiff from bringing an individual action because of the possibil-
ity that the complaint might be construed as asserting a claim
(against any one defendant) that is subject to the limits on recovery
created by section 1708. Section 1711 would, however, probably
make it easier to maintain class actions for violations of the pro-
posed Federal Securities Code, since section 1711(h) authorizes the
trial court to require the defendants to pay part or all of the costs
of notice to members of the class.
The advantages flowing from the adoption of section 1708 may
be outweighed by the procedural problems created by section 1711.
Accordingly, alternative procedures should be considered for han-
dling the proration and distribution of damages, including the pro-
cedures recently proposed for the improved handling of class ac-
tions, incorporated in Senate Bill 3475,58 introduced by Senator
DeConcini (for himself and Senator Kennedy), and drafted by the
Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the
United States Department of Justice. Such procedures seem prefer-
able to those that would be established by section 1711 of the Fed-
eral Securities Code.
58. S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
1979]1 571

